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In an effort to reshape the US correctional system, one of President Joe Biden’s first executive 
orders ended future contracts between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and private prison 
corporations. Symbolic at best, this left in place the biggest money-maker of the private prison 
system, private immigration detention facilities. The contracts that guide US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities favor profit over detainee well-being. This research 
showcases the poor quality of private immigration detention facilities with a focus on access to 
legal representation. With financial and physical barriers preventing detainees from receiving 
legal help, the US detention system works against due process. As contracts under the DOJ were 
terminated, contracts under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and ICE must end in 
order to see a change in corrections. 
Key terms: Alternative to Detention (ATD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), immigration 
detention, legal access, privatization 
Introduction 
 Since the 1990s, countries across the world have demonstrated an increasing reliance on 
privatization. In the United States, privatization has occurred in all sectors of the government: 
airport operation, water utilities, waste collection, data processing, and the focus of this research, 
immigration detention.1 As a consequence of the War on Drugs, public prisons became 
overpopulated, giving way for the creation and reliance on private detention facilities to 
capitalize on mass incarceration and immigration. Private prison corporations have an effect on 
 
1 Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability. (2006). Government 
Privatization; History, Examples, and Issues. Prepared for the State of Illinois.  
 3 
the design, build, finance, operation, and maintenance of these detention centers. To establish a 
facility, the government and private prison corporation must enter into a contract. Contracts lay 
out the ‘terms and conditions’ of the facility and the standards it must meet. The specificities of 
contracts used by the Department of Homeland Security have been crafted to prioritize profit 
over detainee well-being. This research will analyze whether the use of private immigration 
detention facilities is justified from both a humanitarian and business perspective by evaluating 
both contracts and evidence of structural violence.  
 Using Johan Galtung’s theory on structural violence, this paper will examine the way 
violence plays out in private detention facilities. Galtung explores violence and peace and finds 
three types of violence: structural, cultural, and direct. Cultural violence is used to justify 
structural violence, and the direct is an outcome of structural violence. Direct violence is the only 
visible conflict demonstrated by physical violence. Both cultural and structural are left unseen, 
with cultural violence showing through racism, discrimination, sexism, and structural violence 
explained as the damage to individuals and groups in the satisfaction of basic human needs: 
survival, welfare, identity, and freedom.2 The private immigration detention system is one way 
structural violence is carried out and allows for instances of direct violence. Using this theory as 
a starting point, this research seeks to identify the argument for private detention, the structural 
violence that comes from it (focusing on access to legal counsel), and the opportunity for reform. 
Private prisons that house United States citizens have been deemed inhumane by President Biden 
as he is phasing out the contracts under the Department of Justice. The following attempts to 
prove that the same injustice that called for the cancellation of contracts under the DOJ should 
apply to those under the DOH.  
 
2 Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6. 
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History 
President Richard Nixon’s formal declaration of the War on Drugs was given strong 
attention beginning in 1971. For the next three decades, the prison population rose by 194%, 
while the overall country population increased by 36%.3 With this drastic rise of those 
incarcerated, overcrowding became prevalent in many facilities across the country. This came to 
a breaking point with a Tennessee federal court ruling that overcrowding was, in fact, in 
violation of the 8th amendment’s cruel and unusual clause.4 With this ruling, CoreCivic, the 
country’s first private prison corporation, proposed to take over Tennessee’s entire prison 
system.5 While this proposition was unsuccessful, it did allow for politicians to realize the 
opportunity for outsourcing correctional and immigration detention services to the private sector. 
The United States was experiencing a neoliberal privatization shift combined with increased 
border control that conflated drugs and immigration enforcement. This was only amplified in 
1986 under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act that required mandatory detention of all non-citizens who 
committed aggravated felony charges.6 Beginning a new era of compulsory immigration 
detention, private immigration detention centers were formed at an alarming rate, and the 
number of reported abuses piled up. In response to one of the largest uprisings in private 
immigration detention, the United States passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 
Together, these laws dramatically increased the number of immigrants in detention from 8,500 in 
1996 to roughly 16,000 in 1998.7 This trend continued for the next decade, and the private 
 
3 Dippel, C & Poyker, M. (2019). How private prisons affect sentencing. VoxEU. 
4 Bauer, S. (2016). My four months as a private prison guard. Mother Jones.  
5 Id. 
6 (1988). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.  
7 Analysis of Immigration Detention Policies. American Civil Liberties Union.  
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immigration detention system saw a 442% increase from 2000 to 2016.8 Despite numerous 
reports from those detained of abuse, the government continued to rely on this corrupt system. 
As the general prison population began to stabilize, in 2016, the Department of Justice 
announced their plans to phase out the use of private prisons, which seemed to be a win for those 
fighting for prioritization of prisoner well-being over profit. The DOJ cited safety issues within 
the facilities that could be attributed to the profit-led contracts. What this so conveniently left out 
were the contracts under the Department of Homeland Security. The evaluation report found that 
consequences of occupancy requirements, which are in both immigration detention and public 
prisons, included higher rates of incarceration and violence.9 Despite clear evidence showing the 
abuse going on in both areas of corrections, only contracts under the DOJ were the focus. This 
effort was tabled when in February of 2017, Jeff Sessions, under the Trump administration, 
announced that the Federal Bureau of Prisons would continue to use and rely on private 
facilities.10 Due to Trump’s hardline approach to immigration, private immigration detention 
centers became ever prevalent, and private prison corporation campaign donations to Republican 
candidates rose.11 Many supporters of President Trump and those within his cabinet have a 
certain negative perception of immigrants, one that could be argued to be an example of racism. 
Racism, as an example of cultural violence, is not new to America nor to our immigration 
system. There is and has been a clear favor given to immigrants of a certain location, ones that 
 
8 Mason, C. (2012). Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of For-Profit Detention. The Sentencing 
Project & Bureau of Justice Statistics.  
9 Deitch, M. (2013). Lockup Quotas and ‘Low-Crime Taxes’ Helping to Make Money for the 
Private Prison Industry. JOTU. 
10 Powell, E. (2017). Sessions memo: Reversal on private prisons could portend shift on justice. 
Bureau of Prisons & US Department of Justice.  
11 Da Silva, C., Walker, J., Jarvis, J. (2020). Private Prison Lobby Targets House, Senate Races 
as Biden Pledges Crackdown. Newsweek. 
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are typically fairer skinned, than to immigrants from countries of people of color. This cultural 
violence of racism has played into how the United States structures its detention system and how 
each detainee is treated. When looking at this treatment specifically, you will find the presence 
of direct violence in ways that are described in the Structural Violence section. Once Trump left 
office in January of 2021, one of President Biden’s first executive orders aimed at tackling the 
shortcomings in US corrections was to finish what Obama began, to end private prison contracts. 
Just like Obama, President Biden left out contracts under the DHS, perhaps an example of how 
strong cultural violence in the form of racism is embedded in the United States. The hypocrisy of 
leaving the DHS out of this executive order puts 500,000 immigrants at risk a year. Out of the 
215 immigration facilities in the US, 175 are privately operated.12 This means that 81% of people 
held in detention are held to the low standards that contracts lay out. In just over a decade, 
private corporations have doubled the number of detainees under their control. They have been 
allowed to do so for the public, and most importantly, the government have been convinced that 
through privatization, costs are cut, and efficiency is improved. 
Hypocrisy of Economics 
 Proponents of privatization argue that taking ownership from the government and putting 
it in privately owned companies’ hands allows for economic efficiency. There are numerous 
reasons why governments turn to privatization: cost reduction, risk transfer, source of revenue, 
quality of service.13 These are all used in the argument for the establishment and use of private 
prisons, but cost reduction is the most pulling incentive when looking at privatization of 
immigration. Private sector service providers are able to conduct the same services as those in 
 
12 (2020). Detention Statistics. Freedom for Immigrants.  
13 Id. 1 
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the public sector and claim they do so at a lower price, not constrained by “restrictions of the 
civil system and public employee bargaining collective.”14 With greater flexibility, the private 
sector is argued to operate with greater efficiency. Applying this argument to privatized 
corrections is not as seamless as it may be for other private industries. There is a divide in the 
statement that private correctional facilities are run with economic efficiency and cut costs, 
especially when looking to immigration detention.  
 Numerous studies have been conducted to test the theory that private corrections are 
more cost-effective than their public counterparts. Looking at the Department of Justice’s report 
to justify the reversal of the Obama-era order ending the use of private prisons, research is 
greatly exaggerated in comparing private vs. public facilities. The report asserts that private 
prisons do save money and do not provide worse quality while providing no hard evidence to 
support this claim.15 It is defensive when discussing the alleged complications and safety issues 
that come with cutting costs by prefacing each statement with “if” – If the reports about the 
shortcomings of our private prisons are true, we should fix it, not end it.16 A similar issue of 
misleading reports is found when looking at private detentions held under ICE. Despite barriers 
in place to cover the mishandling of budgets and detainees, there are congressional watchdogs in 
place, like the Government Accountability Office (GAO), who help provide transparency.  
 Of the 49.8 billion allocated to the Department of Homeland Security, 14% is set aside 
for ICE. Of this 14% or 10.4 billion, a majority is set aside for expansion and detention. Trailing 
far below any money set aside for beds or new facilities is the limited budget going towards 
 
14 Gotsch, K. & Batsi, V. (2018). Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: US Growth in Private 
Prisons. The Sentencing Project. 
15 Volokh, S. (2016). Don’t end private prisons; the DOJ’s announcement. Washington Post. 
16 Id.  
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successful, less oppressive programs like the Alternative to Detention (ATD) program or the 
Migrant Protection Protocol.17 This budget is problematic for the countless inconsistencies and 
errors in calculations found by the GAO. ICE uses the formula: projected average daily 
population x projected bed rate x 365 days = projected detention costs, to help guide their 
congressional budget justifications. This formula has allowed for miscalculations that cost 
taxpayers millions. ICE claims their budgets undergo multiple reviews to ensure accuracy, but 
when documents were requested to justify 40 of their newest contracts, ICE could not produce 
the proper documentation for 28.18 In just one month in 2020, ICE spent nearly $21 million for 
12,000 unused beds each day.19 Underestimation and misrepresentation are driven by ICE’s need 
to showcase efficiency. This effectively misleads stockholders, the public, and the government, 
all while keeping detainees suffering. The budget for ICE continues to grow each year, no matter 
the party in office. If the primary justification of private immigration detention use is that it is 
cost-effective, there needs to be a reevaluation of these contracts. There is irrational economics at 
play facilitated by a complete lack of oversight in one of the most expensive yet destructive 
correctional systems in the US.  
Structural Violence 
Oversight 
 ICE’s mission statement ensures that “detainees reside in safe, secure, and humane 
environments under appropriate conditions of confinement.”20 This cannot be assumed to be true 
when an extreme lack of oversight plagues private immigration detention facilities. In a public 
 
17 Wolf, C. (2021). FY 2021 Budget in Brief. The Department of Homeland Security. 
18 (2021). Immigration Detention: Actions Needed to Improve Planning, Documentation, and 
Oversight of Detention Facility Contracts. US Government Accountability Office. 
19 Id.  
20 (2021). ICE’s Mission. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  
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prison, the public can easily access information for a detailed account of when an instance of 
abuse has occurred. It is difficult to hold the guards, facility, corporation, or government 
accountable for any mistreatment in private facilities when reports are hidden. In an attempt to 
fight this, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a freedom of information law that requires 
the total or partial disclosure of unreleased documents under the control of the United States 
government.21 However, as a private company, groups like GEO group or Core Civic can claim 
fear of information harming competition and effectively evade transparency. One of the only 
ways the public has gotten access to recent facility reports is thanks to a three-year-long 
litigation brought by the National Immigrant Justice Center through the FOIA.22 What should be 
an act that gives accountability simply allows private detention corporations to respond in a 
delayed manner, not respond at all, or take on costly prolonged litigation.  
 As an added barrier to transparency and accountability are the varying contractually 
obligated detention standards of detention facilities. Data obtained via the FOIA by request of 
the Immigrant Legal Resource Center includes information on the type of contracts, 
demographics, medical care providers, and inspection history for over 1,000 federal detention 
facilities. What this displayed were the 11 different detention standards used by facilities and the 
consistency at which they passed inspection. ICE has three sets of detention standards: the 2000 
Nation Detention Standards (NDS), 2008 Performance-Based National Detention Standards 
(PBNDS), and the 2011 PBNDS, yet only 65% of their detention centers are actually 
contractually bound by one of these three.23 This has left an average of 5,000 immigrants a day 
 
21 (1967). Freedom of Information Act. US Department of Justice. 
22 NJIC, DWN. (2015). Lives in Peril: How Ineffective Inspections Make ICE Complicit in 
Immigration Detention Abuse. The Immigration Detention Transparency and Human Rights 
Project.  
23 Id.  
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that are being held in facilities running under different guidelines, most often ones that allow for 
worsened conditions. ICE claims that regardless of standards listed in the contract, all facilities 
are inspected using one of their three standards. What the GAO found in 2014 was that ICE 
simply obtains a facility’s agreement to be inspected according to newer standards but fails to 
explicitly incorporate the new standards into the contract.24  This allows ICE to avoid opening 
contract negotiations and creates a complicated web of multiple guidelines that make it difficult 
to hold each facility accountable for its sub-standard conditions. As a result, no matter the 
number of abuse reports of detainees in ICE’s care, their facilities continue to pass inspection.  
 Since 2012, each ICE facility has passed nearly every inspection – even those where 
multiple people have died as a result of medical neglect, an example of direct and structural 
violence as there is a destruction of survival and welfare. The Immigration Detention 
Transparency and Human Rights Project report of 2015 shows a continuation of this pattern 
where only one out of 100 facilities was given a non-passing rating.25 This is only propelled by 
who is conducting the inspections and when. First addressing the latter, scheduled inspections 
should be unknown to those running the facilities, yet facilities often have ample time to make 
superficial changes to appear to meet standards. At Winn Correctional Center, an asylum seeker 
with disabilities affecting his mobility made multiple requests for a wheelchair that were left 
unmet. This violation of a legal requirement to provide him with reasonable accommodation was 
covered by placing the detainee in a medical unit under heavy sedatives when inspectors came.26 
Obstructing this detainee’s right to welfare, which by definition includes health and happiness, is 
 
24 Id. 18 
25 Id. 22 
26 ACLU, Human Rights Watch, NIJC. (2020). Justice-Free Zones; US Immigration Detention 
Under the Trump Administration. ACLU Research Report.  
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proof of structural violence. Similarly, in the controversial centers that house children who have 
been cruelly separated from their families, reports of teddy bears being given out right before 
inspections were scheduled have been given. Part of the reason these centers are made aware of 
when inspections are scheduled has to do with the previously mentioned issue of who is giving 
the inspections. Inspections by the ICE Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) 
and the Office of Detention Oversight (ODO) inform facilities of inspections in advance, adding 
to the issue of superficial fixes.27 Additionally, the inspections lack independent oversight as 
they are often paid and vetted through contracts or are direct employees of ICE. The lack of 
transparency does not stop there. Even after initial inspection reports are given, there is an 
opportunity to edit said reports before they are finalized and submitted to the monitoring unit.  
Overall, inspections of ICE detention facilities are not designed to capture actual conditions at 
any given facility but are designed to pass inspection with a simple checklist of bare minimum 
criteria.  
 Producing a similar effect that the various detention standards have are the different 
levels where privatization can occur. ICE’s detention system involves more than 200 facilities 
that can contract with private prison companies, country and city jails, state prisons – all of 
whom can use private companies for varying sectors. Guards, food, transportation, medical 
services, cleaning services, and more can all be contracted to the private sector. When some 
facilities have privatization occur at only certain levels, it again creates a complicated web that 
allows for lack of transparency and accountability when trying to evaluate standards and 
corruption.  
 
27 (2012). Northwest Detention Center Tacoma WA. ERO and ODO Inspection.  
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Having transparency regarding the instances of direct and structural violence in private 
detention centers would allow for a complete analysis of how privatization encourages harm. 
However, with many records being inaccessible to the public, this research relies on the limited 
available data. Thanks to non-profit organizations such as Freedom for Immigrants or the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), there is insight into the type and prevalence of the 
various levels of violence. The structural violence ranges from a lack of medical care, prolonged 
detention, solitary confinement, and legal access. The direct includes cleanliness issues and 
sexual and verbal abuse. The non-profit organization, The Intercept, filed a FOIA request for 
detailed records of sexual abuse in detention. ICE reports that it investigates all reports of abuse, 
but of the 1,224 sexual abuse complaints between 2010 and 2017, only 43 were investigated.28 
This direct abuse is only possible through the culturally rooted racism and discrimination 
combined with structural barriers to welfare and freedom. The Washington Post and The New 
York Times delivered groundbreaking exposés in 2008 that revealed the lack of adequate 
medical care, the most reported structural abuse within detention centers.29 Adding to the 
argument, the same year, a report described various detention centers’ deplorable medical care, 
food, living conditions, and barriers to legal information, something found in ICE facilities 
across the country. Medical care is not a priority to these private corporations for it is expensive, 
and they need not worry about failing an inspection when the checklists inspectors use fail to 
include all components of detention standards. At the Houston Processing Center in Texas, ERO 
inspectors found no shortcomings of the facility but failed to interview anyone kept in solitary 
confinement, a mandated inspection process. As a result, a 31-year-old man who was kept only 
 
28 Speri, A. (2018). Detained, Then Violated. The Intercept. 
29 Bernstein, N. (2008). Few Details on Immigrants Who Died in Custody. The New York Times. 
A Closer Look at 83 Deaths. The Washington Post.  
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for six days died in confinement for the ERO did not follow up on the many filed grievances.30 
Inspectors are sticking to the bare minimum while turning an eye to the reality of inhumane 
treatment. At a detention center in Georgia, both the ERO and ODO inspections were able to 
identify a significant disregard of medical care: examinations were not reviewed by physicians in 
a timely manner. Despite evidence showing the understaffed medical team and an unnecessary 
detainee death, both inspection agencies ruled the medical staffing was adequate.31 The most 
concerning example of lack of accountability comes from the Tri-County Detention Center in 
Illinois. After receiving a recommended rating of “does not meet standards,” when the official 
rating was released in 2012, it suddenly was confirmed that the facility “meets standards.”32 For 
troubling findings regarding needles and inadequate staff, suddenly, the facility was back to a 
passing grade. This goes back to what was mentioned earlier in that detention centers are able to 
change their rating before the official publication. What happened to change this rating is left 
unknown for again, as a private corporation, records can be kept hidden. The 5th and 14th 
Amendments of the US Constitution entitle detainees to be free of abuse at the hands of the state. 
Private detention facilities have effectively gone against this right and continuously promote 
structural violence.  
Covid-19 
Access to proper medical care has become increasingly relevant in the midst of the 
Covid-19 Pandemic. Private detention centers make the most money with each bed full and the 
center at capacity. As businesses around the world closed and changed occupancy allowance, 
ICE was still operating at populations far above the recommended amount. Carlos Mejia, a 57-
 
30 (2012). Exposé & Close: Houston Processing Center.  
31 Pulaski. (2012). Prisoners of Profit: Immigrants and Detention in Georgia. ACLU. 
32 Id.  
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year-old man from El Salvador, was the first to die of Covid-19 in ICE’s custody on May 6, 
2020.33 2020 saw the highest annual death toll of people in ICE custody in 15 years, largely due 
to Covid-19. Of the 21 reported deaths, eight were attributed to Covid-19.34 Under the Covid-19 
Immigration Detention Data Transparency Act, ICE has been releasing their reported data. In 
true ICE fashion, the data available has been reported not to reflect the true scope of the spread 
of the virus.35 Vera researchers have reported that the actual number of Covid-19 cases in 
detention may be 15 times higher than what ICE revealed. As overcrowding and a lack of 
resources have been constant in ICE detention, it can be assumed that much of the spread could 
have been prevented under the proper standards, but again, a hindrance of welfare is perpetuated 
by the structure of this system. Working as its own call for an end or shift away from detention 
use, Covid-19 demands a change in our detention system to avoid future spread.  
As the number of reported grievances rises, there is an increasing need for legal counsel. 
The accusations of abuse are countless and oftentimes only brought to light with the help of pro-
bono, non-profit work that is limited to begin with. Reliance on these stretched-out organizations 
is partly due to the lack of legal access by detainees within detention facilities, a form of 
structural violence that blocks freedom.  
Legal Access 
 The rights of immigrants in the United States are characterized by limitations and 
qualifications. Current laws, detention standards, and oversight have all had a hand in the level of 
access detainees have to legal counsel. The Freedom from Arbitrary Detention Act within Article 
 
33 (2021). Immigration Detention and Covid-19. Brennan Center for Justice.  
34 (2021). Death Detainee Reports Released by ICE. American Immigration Lawyers 
Association. 
35 Smart, N., Garcia, A., Siulc, N. (2021). One Year Later, We Still Don’t Know How Many 
People in ICE Detention Have Been Exposed to Covid-19. Vera Institute of Justice. 
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9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights rules unlawful detention illegal. This occurs 
when an individual is arrested and detained without due process or any legal basis. With this, the 
US criminal justice system is mandated to provide detained individuals with the opportunity to 
challenge their detention in court. Still, this right is denied to those in immigration detention. 
Mandatory detention is imposed before an immigrant can reach a hearing with an immigration 
judge. This includes non-criminal asylum seekers to those convicted of certain crimes. 
Immigrants have a right to due process as prescribed by the Constitution, included in the term 
“persons.” Despite being guaranteed this right, the US fails to provide due process for detainees 
consistently. Immigrants are often held without a clear explanation of the charges against them 
and without gaining timely access to a hearing before a judge.36   
 Opportunity for legal counsel is the best way to ensure due process, but as the US 
government is not required to provide this to immigrants, far too many go through the process 
unrepresented. It is a sad truth that oftentimes, a detainee must forego legal representation 
because they cannot afford to retain one. The costs come from many places, not solely the 
lawyer’s fee. One of the biggest obstacles to keeping legal counsel is the inability to speak with a 
lawyer on a consistent basis. Detainees are often moved in the system, on average more than 
twice. This makes the process from the lawyer’s side extremely difficult. From the detainee, 
limitations on telephone calls and legal mail put a block on gaining representation. Recall the 
inspections of facilities that pass despite operating at a sub-standard level. In a 2012 ERO 
inspection, the detention facility’s phone system was marked as standard, even though the 
hotline programmed into the phones never reached an operator.37 Even in facilities that had 
 
36 (2009). US Remote Detainee Lockups Hinder Justice. Human Rights Watch. 
37 Id. 22 
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operating phones for legal calls, the attorney-client confidentiality is completely erased as 
facility staff are able to monitor.38 Confidentiality is hard to come by in overcrowded centers that 
work at taking away individuals’ humanity. This has also shown through in the lack of 
mandatory outlets where detainees can voice their grievances.39 The most common found issue, 
however, is the cost of calls. While the government does not need to provide or even help 
detainees find legal counsel, they need not actively prevent immigrants from exercising their due 
process right.  
 Besides pure cost, private immigration detention centers have limited legal access based 
on their location. Under the Trump Administration, ICE saw more contracts than ever before. 
Since 2017, this growth was seen in places where immigrants were far removed from attainable 
legal counsel and most likely to lose their cases. The ACLU found that when comparing 
detention centers operating before 2017 to those after, those operating before had four times the 
amount of available immigration attorneys within a 100-mile radius. More than half of 
individuals in immigration court are left unrepresented, and 84% in detention are without 
counsel.40 Even when a detainee is able to meet with an immigration judge, it does not mean they 
are given a fair chance. Immigration judges operate with an incentive to move as quickly as 
possible. They have a pile of cases to get through and face punishment if they do not go through 
them fast enough. This has created an ineffective system that detains non-criminal immigrants, 
wastes taxpayer dollars, and provides unfair trials.  
 
38 Id. 32 
39 Pulaski. (2011). Information regarding drop box deficiencies is annotated. ERO Inspection. 
40 Cullen, T. (2018). ICE Released Its Most Comprehensive Immigration Detention Data Yet. It’s 
Alarming. NIJC, A Heartland Alliance Program. 
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 The United States detains 500,000 immigrants each year and fighting for their right to 
due process and legal services are approximately 102 organizations. Of these 102, the majority 
have less than five staff members focused solely on detention work.41 Financial and geographic 
obstacles have left a large majority of detainees to understand the intricate US immigration 
system alone. Conditions have only worsened under ICE’s new version of its National Detention 
Standards. In December 2020, an updated NDS was released to guide the treatment of immigrant 
detainees. From ICE’s webpage itself, it claims the new standards are updated and modernized.42 
What it should say is oppressive and inhumane. The ACLU’s National Prison Project team put 
together a side-by-side comparison of the new NDS to the 2000 NDS. The following were found 
to be negatively impacted: environmental health and safety, admission and release, security 
inspections, funds and personal property, hold rooms in detention facilities, food service, 
disciplinary policy, hunger strikes, medical care, personal hygiene, detainee transfers, recreation, 
correspondence and mail, law libraries and legal materials, legal rights group presentations, and 
more.43 The most relevant for this research are the last three items.  
 For correspondence and mail, the new NDS removes the provision that mail should be 
opened in the detainee’s presence, again impeding on lawyer-client confidentiality. These 
standards have also limited the amount of legal mail a detainee can receive to five pieces a week. 
A detainee can be removed without a given notice in the manner of a few days or hours of initial 
detention, making this constricted communication a hindrance to their chance of stay. This NDS 
 
41 Araujo, D., Berndt, E., McCarthy, M., et al. (2010). Isolated in Detention; Limited Access to 
Legal Counsel in Immigration Detention Facilities Jeopardizes a Fair Day in Court. National 
Immigrant Justice Center. 
42 (2019). National Detention Standards for Non-Dedicated Facilities. US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement.  
43 Cho, E. (2019). Summary of Changes to ICE National Detention Standards. ACLU Legal 
Department National Prison Project. 
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also removes the required list of legal materials that ICE is mandated to provide within their 
library. Facilities are no longer required to provide a law library that is reasonably large, 
accessible, and isolated. Most harmful, the clause that officers should provide the maximum 
amount of time to detainees to use the law library has been removed. Lastly, in addition to being 
geographically removed from legal rights groups, the NDS has limited their access. The old 
standard required that all facilities fully cooperate with those seeking to give legal presentations, 
and that is now removed. What the new standard dictates is that it is up to the discretion of the 
said facility. How presentations are given, who they let in, and the distribution of material have 
been left unclear and therefore defer to the local policy. While this could ultimately expand the 
reach of legal expertise, what it will do is constrict it even further. ICE claims they are 
“enhancing legal access,” yet every single one of their new standards shows the opposite.44 Even 
as ICE added regulation on sexual assault, they take away the chance of legal action regarding 
that assault. It is a Band-Aid fix that is meant to fool the public, but with just a little digging, true 
hypocrisy is evident.  
Alternative to Detention Reform 
 As mentioned when discussing ICE’s budget allocation, the Alternative to Detention 
(ATD) program is receiving an increase yet a relatively small portion of said budget. ATD is 
defined as: any law, policy or practice by which persons are not detained for reasons relating to 
their migration status.45 ICE reports that in the first month of FY 2018, 71% of people detained 
were put in mandatory detention. Over half of this population was marked as non-criminal, no 
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threat, and 23% were classified as the lowest threat. With only 15% classified as the highest 
threat, there is no explanation for the number of immigrants given mandatory detention. The 
argument that proceeds claims the ATD program is the best way to shift the United States’ 
overuse of detention to a more effective and cheap process.  
 Addressing effectiveness, the existing ATD programs consist of parole, bond, check-ins 
at ICE offices, home visits, telephonic monitoring, and GPS monitoring through ankle 
bracelets.46 This current system takes a restrictive approach to alternatives that are focused on 
control rather than collaboration and engagement. Still, this program proves to be effective not 
only in the United States but across the world with one stipulation: competent legal counsel. 
When detainees are released within the ATD program, they have increased rates of finding legal 
counsel. When gaining this counsel, compliance and appearance rates were significant in several 
countries. Lawyers are able to work as a point of contact with the authorities and effectively 
explain and remind their clients of necessary steps. A United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) study compiled 13 ATD programs and found compliance rates to range 
between 80-99.9%.47 From the United States, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, Hong Kong, 
Thailand, and more, there is an average compliance rate of 90% when using the ATD program. 
Where there is an even greater success is with a community-based ATD approach. 
 In the United States, the Intensive Supervision of Appearance Program (ISAP) 
community supervision program showed an impressive 99% and 95% appearance rate for court 
and removal hearings, respectively.48 ATD programming should not simply be a continuation of 
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oppressive monitoring seen within detention facilities but a genuine alternative. Instead of 
removing immigrant dignity through tactics such as ankle-monitoring, participants should be in 
contact with community services that range from legal, social, to medical and mental health. 
When immigrants not only understand the process but believe it to be fair, compliance goes up.49 
This is so important not only from a humanitarian perspective but a business one as well. 
 Not only is compliance up an average of 90%, but ATD programs are found to cost up to 
80% less than detention.50 Canada found that it costs $10-12 per day per person in an ATD 
program, while someone in detention costs $179 per day. With even more success, the cost of 
participation in this program in the United States is less than five dollars per day, saving $125 
when compared to in-facility detention. This is not a new concept but a still underused one. 
Looking back to 1999, a project run by the Lutheran Immigrant and Refugee Services (LIRS) in 
the United States found that community release cost 3% of what detention would.51 What is 
important to mention is the low costs are heavily reliant on pro-bono services from non-profit 
organizations and their workers. If the US were to simply increase the use of ATD programs, it 
would overextend these organizations and potentially hamper their success. Instead, the current 
budget should be reallocated to support some of these services, potentially running them in 
contract with the government. There is still an opportunity to cut costs, but there must be a risk 
evaluation done to protect the organizations that have so long served the immigrants that the 
government has left behind. 
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 While the current ATD programs have proven success and cut costs, there are still 
improvements to be made. First, as mentioned, a shift to community-based approaches to 
preserve dignity and remain cost-effective. It is important to note that the proposed community-
based ATD programs would still require proper evaluation and would only be given to non-
criminal immigrants. Next, and most important, is a reevaluation of the process that determines 
who is eligible for these programs. Mandatory detention is used in cases where the immigrant 
poses neither a flight risk nor a threat. Partially due to the overwhelmed immigration court 
system, judges do not give a comprehensive evaluation to each immigrant when processing their 
eligibility for ATD. This has left many individuals in unnecessary detention for prolonged 
periods of time. Detainees can request an ATD hearing with a judge but are given one hearing 
only, with no guarantee they will be granted their request. This was especially prevalent in new 
detention centers under ICE’s New Orleans Field Office. This office denied 99.1% of all 
applications for release on parole in 2019.52  The high rate of denial can be attributed to 
misinformation and the lack of legal representation. Without representation, detainees frequently 
lose their appeals and can result in faster deportation or more expensive bonds. This brings up 
the next issue within the ATD system, the cost of a bond. The minimum bond amount is set at 
$1,500, but depending on a judge’s evaluation, it can reach up to $20,000 or more.53 The price is 
dependent on the immigrant’s flight risk, but again, without a comprehensive evaluation system, 
the price is often set without proper cause and is unattainable.  
The ATD system is operating in a cost-effective manner and is a proven success in 
countries across the world. There is room to improve this efficiency with an appropriate 
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evaluation of each immigrant that crosses the border and even further, with a shift to increased 
reliance on community services. 
Conclusion 
 The United States immigration detention system, both private and public, perpetuates a 
system of structural violence. With 81% of detainees being held in private facilities that use 
outdated and low-standard contracts, focusing on private facilities is the right place to start. 
However, the 40 facilities that make up 19% of immigration detention that are publicly run are 
not without their faults. Despite their reports of abuse, what keeps this research from focusing on 
the detention centers completely run under the government is the accountability that is forced 
upon them. The biggest problem of privatization is the lack of transparency and accountability, 
which is why that is the focus of this thesis. Contracts are shaped to encourage profit, with no 
regard to the reality of conditions for immigrants in ICE facilities. The focus of this research was 
to uncover if using private detention centers is justified. To do so, the argument that privatization 
allows for cost reduction was analyzed along with the production of structural violence. Thought 
to increase efficiency, ICE is continually under investigation for a complete lack of oversight 
that wastes millions of dollars each month. Private detention is not saving the government or US 
citizens money, and is in fact, expanding this waste every year with no substantial justification as 
to why. From a business perspective, ICE’s continued and increasing reliance on privatization is 
a failure. From a humanitarian perspective, this failure is further amplified. Immigrants have 
very few rights in the United States, but within these few, they are guaranteed due process. ICE’s 
private detention centers have found a way to avoid this right by imposing unnecessary 
mandatory detention and curbing legal access, therefore obstructing the basic human need of 
freedom. There is a level of obstruction to freedom with any detention system. The difference 
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here is that ICE facilities cross a line from what is legally mandated to oppressing even the 
possibility of fighting for freedom. Legal counsel is vital to the success of detainees and their 
ability to be granted a stay. To put any obstacles in detainees' path to freedom is to perpetuate 
structural violence. It becomes even more pertinent when analyzing the various grievances that 
are reported within detention centers. Detainees experience both physical and mental harm under 
ICE’s watch and are now prevented from bringing these atrocities to light, for they cannot 
readily access legal counsel. While privatization can bring success in the form of saving costs 
and improving efficiency, the US immigration and detention system is not a sector where this 
can be applied.  
 The United States is already phasing out privatization under the Department of Justice. If 
this cannot be applied to the Department of Homeland Security immediately, a review of the 
changes within the US prison system since the cancellation of contracts would be warranted. The 
contracts were canceled for they promoted profit and left detainees in understaffed facilities that 
met the lowest standard. To observe improvements in maintenance and detainee care in facilities 
transitioning out of privatization would show justification for applying this same roll-out to ICE 
detention centers. A thorough comparison of facilities run under the government and those 
contracted out is needed to either show the success of privatization or truly showcase the failure. 
Currently, there is not a system in place to be able to compare these facilities side-by-side, and 
with that, there would be a stronger argument for a call to action. Full transparency in ICE’s 
budget and thorough, unbiased investigations of their facilities would further this call to action. 
The government cannot continue to rely on Core Civic and Geo Group, for their numbers and 
reports are not accurate representations of what detainees experience. In gaining this 
transparency, the government would be forced to hold ICE accountable. Getting the public and 
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government to care about immigrants is not an easy task. Death, sexual assault, separated 
families, and more, yet none of these have been enough to warrant a change. The only way to see 
the change that is needed is to appeal to what is important to the people in charge: money. As 
immigration waits for municipalization, the Alternative to Detention program is the best option 
to act as a cost-saving, humane way to treat the hundreds of thousands of immigrants fleeing to 
the United States each year with the hope of safety. This paper argues for the removal of private 
immigration detention facilities altogether and an increased reliance on the Alternative to 
Detention programs that facilitate community engagement.  
